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settlement, and the longer this is
delayed, the more difficult it will be
and the greater our dangers will become.
“From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war,
I am convinced that there is nothing
they admire so much as strength, and
there is nothing for which they have
less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of
power is unsound. We cannot afford
. . . to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.
If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter,
their influence for furthering those
principles will be immense and no one
is likely to molest them. If however
they become divided or falter in their
duty and if these all–important years
are allowed to slip away then indeed
catastrophe may overwhelm us all.
“Last time I saw it all coming and
cried aloud to my own fellowcountrymen and to the world, but no

one paid any attention. Up till the
year 1933 or even 1935, Germany
might have been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken her and
we might all have been spared the
miseries [Adolfl Hitler let loose upon
mankind. There never was a war in
all history easier to prevent by timely
action than the one which has just
desolated such great areas of the
globe. It could have been prevented,
in my belief, without the firing of a
single shot, and Germany might be
powerful, prosperous and honoured
today; but no one would listen and
one by one we were all sucked into
the awful whirlpool. We surely must
not let that happen again. This can
only be achieved by reaching now, in
1946, a good understanding on all
points with Russia under the general
authority of the United Nations Organisation and by the maintenance of
that good understanding through
many peaceful years, by the world
instrument, supported by the whole
strength of the English+peaking
world and all its connections. There

is the solution which I respectfully
offer to you in this Address to which
I have given the title ‘The Sinews of
Peace.’
<c
If the population of the
Engiish~peaking Commonweahhs be
added to that of the United States with
all that such cooperation implies in the
air, on the sea, all over the globe and
in science and in industry, and in moral
force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its
temptation to ambition or adventure.
On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of securit y. If we
adhere faithfully to the Charter of the
United Nations and walk forward in
sedate and sober strength seeking in no
one’s land or treasure, seeking to lay
no arbitrary control upon the thoughts
of men; if all British moral and material forces and convictions are joined
with your own in fraternal association,
the high-roads of the future will be
clear, not only for us but for all, not
only for our time, but for a century to
come.” MR
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THE NEW WORLD STRATEGY
A Militaty Policy for
America’s Future by HaITY G.
Summers Jr. 270 pages. Sirnon &
Schuster,Inc., New York. 1995.$11.00.

A well-known, respected military
scholar and decorated Korean and
Vietnam war veteran, retired US
Army Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr.
is a former holder of prestigious chairs
at the US Army War College and Marine Corps University. Best known for
his On Strategy: A CriticalAnalysis of
the Ketnam War (1982); On Strate~
II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War
(1992); and his weekly column in
Army ~mes, his important associa-

tions and powerfi.d influence make
him one of ourcountry’s military intellectual elites.
With military and scholarly credentials such as these, Summers’ writings
carry massive weight, m evidenced by
prestigious individuals’ accolades on
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the back cover of his latest book The
World Strategy.
But, like the
naive young child in the much celebrated tale “The Emperor’s New
Clothes,” I do not see what others see
in this book. I believe Summers’ treatise-while magnificently written and
expertly researched-to be inherently
flawed. Its critical weakness stems
from a reliance on Carl von Clausewitz
as a timeless strategist instead of as one
whose ideas are rapidly becoming obsolete due to changing technical, social, economic and politico-military
conditions. The danger of relying on
such a perceptual lens is that it blinds
one to changing world conditions.
Summers states, “What we are
faced with is not so much a revolution
as an evolution in military affairs, as
military policies adapt to meet what
Clausewitz called the course of events
and their likely consequences.” This
statement asks the reader to take a leap
of faith, as Summers has, and elevate
New

Clausewitz’s thoughts to dogma. This
striking statement also surfaces another concern of mine, far better articulated by Major Ralph Peters, US
Army. He says, “The relevant institutions of the US government need to redefine themselves vis-h–vis the rest of
the world, but we will probably fail to
do so until the situation becomes so
desperate, it threatens our elites and the
money-buffered enclaves in which
they live, learn and work.”l Summers’
inability to move beyond Clausewitz
as a deity means he dces not properly
address many critical US security issues.
The New WorldStrategy’s most important chapter is its brilliantly written
“Dangers to Democmcy.” The shift
toward operations other than war
(OOTW), a now defunct term, as the
principal military post-Cold War role
is viewed as destabilizing because of
the future potential it generates for a
US military coup.2 The solution to this
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toward operations other than war
(OOTW), a now defunct term, as the
principal military post-Cold War role
is viewed as destabilizing because of
the future potential it generates for a
US military coup. 2 The solution to
this dangerous trend toward 00TW,
which Summers views as taking
place, is a Rturn to our traditional
Armed Forces warfighting focus.
A revulsion against peace enforcement and peacekeeping (PK)--+r
counterinsurgency as it was called in
the 1960s-is understandable.3 One
does not want the “ghost of Vletnarn
past” to haunt an Army that has
worked so hard and so successfully to
put that traumatic experience behind
it. Ye~ since publication of this book,
the Bosnia operation that Summers
and many of us find so repugnant has
finally begun.
If one follows Summers’ “Ten
Commandments,” which provide a
future US military policy, PK is to be
peripheral. This means we should allow the military to fight and win the
nation’s wars, as defined in the
Clausewitzian universe, that specifically take place among nation-states.
Summers finds it far better to mate an
expanded Peace Corps and tasks the
Department of State with the mission.
Under such a scenario, our military
institutions would remain uncorrupted, providing as little stabilizing
support as possible, which has somehow been done in counterdrug operations. The fallacy of such a policy is
it ignores a “revolution in military and
polihcal affairs” that is well underway.
If we follow Summers’ advice and ensure that our military institutions ignore the new form of non-Western
warfare developing as part of this
transformation, we will make those
institutions irrelevant to Mm-e battlefields.
War is no longer waged solely
among nation+tates, nor can we define war in the narrow Clausewitzian
sense as a struggle among nation-states or their coalitions over the preservation and extension of national
sovereignty. War is now a struggle
among competing forms of social and
political organizations based on simultaneous political regionalization and
fragmentation trends that will decide
our nation’s and the world’s future.
The character of other nation-states
within this context may very well take
on a different thnmt perspective. A

case in point—a hostile Mexican
nation-state sharing our border would
undoubtedly be cause for concern.
However, our military forces as they
are now configured would have little
trouble quickly defeating such a belligerent. Conversely, a failed Mexican
state that was becoming another Bosnia or hbanon would pose a US security nightmare. Imagine the level of
civil unrest generated by hordes of
displaced, starving refugees crossing
into US border states. It would not be
easy to achieve “victory’’-if this is
even the proper term-against a fragmented Mexican state full of private
armies, local warlords and drug barons in which war was the natural end
state and peace an anomaly.
Summers’ is apparently blind to
such strategic perceptions or that the
global emergence of new warrnaking
entities, such as private armies, &e
corporations and orgamzed crime networks, represents a principal post–
Cold War US security t.lmat. He does
not recognized that the US military
has won its final Clausewitzian
struggle. The Cold War is over, and
the United States is the victor. No
nation–state
fighting within the
Clausewitzian paradigm can now, or
in the future, ever hope to defeat us.
The Prussian military before its
crushing Jena-Auerstadt defeat won
an earlier struggle based on the principlesof Absolutism.
That struggle
was set on the Continent within the
Frederickian paradigm in the age of
the dynastic-states temporally preceding Summers’ analytical focus. My
point is that Summers’ policy recommendations are based on an old world
that is passing, rather than on the new
world that is emerging. He advocates
fighting the old way, as did the Prussians. What we should be doing, however, is radically reforming our military as the French did during their
Re~olutionary wars.
�
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Nothing could be worse for our nation than believing Summers’ observation that “when it comes to military policies for America’s fiture,
there will be no ‘revolution in military
afMrs’ either in that phrase’s narrow
sense as an inforrnation+ge battlefield civilization, or in the broader
sense of an upheaval in current military structure, organization and doctrine. Generally, revolutions are
sparked by catastrophic breakdowns
of the existing system or by massive
threats that the system is unable to
manage. Neither is true today.”4
The sole intent of the revolution in
military and political affairs initiatives
is to fix our existing system before
we suffer a catastrophic breakdown.
Those issues Summers fears most
have not been resolved. PK operations am a professionally repulsive
form of warfare waged against subnationa.ls and other groups that do not
play by the unwritten rule that says,
“Only nation-states legally have the
right to make war.” These are the operations that will become central to
our Armed Forces’ mission. In a war
over future social organization, we
have no choice.
Summers is right when he says
Clausewitz’s Trinitarian conceptpeople, the government and the military-is
the US military’s foundation
stone. That a potential fiture military
coup might take place within our nation, stemming from what PK operations are likely to do to our civil–
military relations, seems a growing
possibility. The fundamental question
Summers Efhses to address is how we
effectively engage in such intrastate
operations while ensuring our nation’s
political and military institutions are
not undermined?
Some of Summers’ policy suggestions in% New World Strategy make
absolute sense in an age when hostile
nation-states and emergent regional–
states will concurrently exist. US and
allied Theater High Altitude Air Defense systems are needed now more
than ever. It is sage advice to have the
capacity to engage in escalation dominance and to recognim we cuxrently
cannot hope to successfully fight two
major regional conflicts. We should
not continue to promote a policy that
states we can. Summers’ book contains a wealth of other information and
useful insights only someone at his
senior level could provide.
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Wrnnxm could yet make a significant and positive impact on the US
militiuypolicy debate if he would re-

rent work is an anachronism. Causing even fhrther consternation is that
% New WorldStrategy is so lauded

fommlate his perceptions and policy

by our nation’s elite, because ulti-

recommendations

within a post–

framework that accepts new forms of threat entities, the
accompanying definitions of war and
traditional nation-state centered cOnHowever, as it stands, his curterns.
Clausewitzian

mately,it representsa strategyfor the
blind. MR
NOTES

1.MAJRalph
Peters,
“Afterthe Rewlution,”Pararnebws(Summa 1995),13.
2. LTCChnrissJ. thmtap Jr.,T’morigihsofthe

kner-

h Military
coupd 2012?” Param#6vs (vvklter
19%+19Q3}7hebst Anerimn WarriocNorwTmditiooal~titimdth eu.s.
mledm:
7hem@wExl#ndw*(w**

1994).

3. Brian M. Jenkhs, 7he ~
VVw
~PA
(San@Mmii CA RN4D,htMr1970).AcomSse@wof Ihe USArm~shabiikytoen-

gageirlcourlterinsurgerlcycarlbefoundilt
Io&ed
doaMnerlt.
4. New cmcepts of @iiim+niiiiry forca stemmhg
Wvsnced battlespacecanfromnorllsihal techdqc
Wptsgivirtg rlsstonew fcmsofmaneuwc and global
~=5ttb@#J10w&l
fw -*
strike
wlndqeslhstklvalidate COL Harry G. Sumrnem Jr.’s Luddiie prc@ons
on miMary organidrmal m.

The American Civil War’s Effect on US River Crossing Doctrine
Major Stephen R. Riese, US Army
The US Army Command and General StaiT College’s Applied Tactics

courseintroducesstudentsto two river
the successfid
crossing scentios:
24th Infantry Division (ID) Naktong
River crossiig during the Komn
Waq and the 36th ID’s failed Rapido
River crossing attempt during World
War Ill Both examples are replete
with mistakes of poor planning and
battle fiction.
Another interesting American example sharing these common problems is the Union Army’s 15 to 17
June 1864 James River crossing. It is
significant because it predates the other two examples by nearly a century,
was a typical Civil War river crossing
and is universally considered successful. Ye4 Civil War crossing successes,
like the one at the James River, contributed indindy
to the mistakes
made later at the Rapido and Naktong
rivers by delaying needed river crossingdoctrinal improvements.
The US Army began crossing rivers in earnest during the Civil War
when hundreds of float bridges—
pontoon boats connected with a
wooden planked roadway—and
trestle bridges-fixed
timber struc~were
constructed over miles of
rivers and streams. Their life spans
were often shoti The pontoon bridges

were especially scarce and typically
dismantled immediately after being
crossed.*
During May and June 1864, Union
Major General George G. Male’s
Amy of the Potomac, and Confederate General Robert E. Ix&s Army of
Northern Virginia raced SOUtiWard
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toward Richrnon4 Virgk@ attempting to outflank each other. During this
maneuvering, the Union Army made
an unexpected James River crossing
20 miles east of Petersburg. This
move nearly gave Meade the element
of surprise he needed to take Petersburg before Lee could complete his
defenses there. In 48 hours, the entire
Army of the Potomac had crossed to
the river’s southern side.3
There is little question that the
James River crossing was a success.
It was described by a US Militiuy
Academy historian as “a model river
crossing” and by Confederate General
E.P. Alexander as “the greatest bridge
which the world has seen since the
days of Xerxes.’4 Although typical in
most technical aspects to other Civil
War crossings, it probably influencd
military thinkers because of the
bridge’s length and the tactical surprise the crossing provided. At 2,200
f- it was the longest float bridge in
recoded history and would remain so
until World War 11.5 Lee was not expecting the Union Army to come at
Petersburg ikom south of the James
River. When General P.G.T. Beauregard reported spotting enemy troops
south of the river, Lee initially refused
to believe the Epofi
The Union Army’s river crossing
plan called for two bridges across the
James River at a namw point near
Fort Powhatan. Engineer Lieutenant
P.S. Michie made the reconnaissance
and selected three suitable sites, one of
which was eventually used. What
Michie did not consider, however, was
the Union Army’s current bcatio~it

still had to march from Cold Harbor to
the James River. Between lay the
Chickahominy River, whe~ Union
engineers had constructed 12 bridges
dmtly east of Richmond two years
earlier.6 Unfortunately, these bridges
had been remov~ destroyed or become dilapidated by 1864. Michie’s
overnight caused the bridging materiel
intended for the second James River
bridge to be diverted to the Chickahominy River bridge. In a 1923 article,
Warren T. Hannum is critical of
Michie’s mistake. He suggests tha~
had the second James River bridge
been built the Union Army could
have attacked Petersburg a day earlier,
before the Confederate defenses were
in place, which might have camied the
city, preventing a protracted and
bloody siege.
The James River crossing site was
not an ideal one. The river’s northern
bank disappard
into a wide marsh
that trcmps and wagons had to cress
before arriving at the river proper. The
bridge constmction mission was given
to the Engineer Brigade. Several of its
volunteer companies were at the
crossing site when the materiel arrived.7 However, many critical supplies were not deposited on dry land
but wm dumped in the swamp “as
though they] had been struck by a cyclone.” J The voluntem refhsed to
obey their officfxx’ O*
to go into
the swamp to gather the pontoons and
begin the bridge work.
After a several-hour delay, Egulars
from the Engineer Battalion amivexi
and these work groups “sprang into
the water, which was almost up to
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